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JURISDICTIONAL STflTEflEHT 
The Court of Rppeals has jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 
26(2)(a) of Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; Sections 77-
1-6(g) and 78-2a-3(2)(k) Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
anended; and Rule 3(a) Utah Rules of Rppellate Procedure. 
This Rppeal has been referred to the Court of Rppeals by 
the Utah Supreme Court. 
I*. 
STRTEHEHT QF ISSUES 
1. Did the trial court err In not dismissing for 
cause a juror whose brother Is a local Ian enforcement 
officer and who had worked previously vith one of the key 
prosecution fitnesses? Abuse of discretion standard. 
Article 1, Section 12, Utah Constitution; Sixth Amendment, 
United States Constitution; Rule 18, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure. State u. Cox. 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992); 
State v. Uoolleu. 610 P.2d 440 (Utah Rpp.) cart denhd} 826 
P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). 
2. Did the trial court err in admitting evidence of 
defendant's prior criminal history and other bad acts? 
Standard of review is abuse of discretion. State v. 
Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232 (Utah 1992). Rules 403, 404, 609, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. 
3. Did the state produce sufficient evidence to 
support the verdict of the Jury? Evidence Is reviewed In 
light most favorable to jury verdict and conviction mill be 
reversed if evidence in support of appellant is such that 
reasonable minds mould have a reasonable doubt as to the 
outcome. State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902 (Utah App. 1990). 
DETERI1IHRT1UE CONSTITUTIONAL PROUiSIONS. STATUTES. RULES 
Texts set forth in the addendum. 
For location in brief, please see table of contents. 
I 
STflTEflEHT QF CRSE 
fl. Nature of the Case 
Oefendant Charles Edge nas charged by information with 
distribution of a controlled substance in violation of 
Section 58-37-8(1)(a) U.C.fl (Supp, 1992), In the Ssventh 
District Court, for acts allegedly occurring on November 
16, 1991. (Record 2-3). The transaction nas alleged to 
have occurred •I thin 1,000 feet of a school and the charge 
was enhanced to a first degree felony, Also charged lere 
Shannon Taylor and Kit Burke, whose cases were handled 
separately. 
6. Course of Proceedings 
On September 21, 1992, a Jury trial mas held in 
Seventh District Court tlth the Honorable Boyd Bunnell 
presiding. Prior to trial, Oefendant filed a motion in 
limine (and supporting memorandum) to exclude testimony 
concerning his prior criminal history. (R. 29-30, 33-36). 
The State did not file a response to defendant's motion. 
Rt trial, Judge Bunnell denied the notion and admitted the 
evidence. (Transcript at 176-78). During his cross-
examination Defendant mas questioned about his prior felony 
convictions for receiving stolen property, arson, and 
burglary, and his misdemeanor conviction for possession of 
drug paraphernalia. (T. 179*80). He mas also questioned 
about a subsequent incident allegedly Involving drug use, 
which he denied. (T. 183-84, 186-87, 189). Officer 
Richmond testified in rebuttal about the subsequent bad 
act, (T. 190-91). 
During voir dire, one of the potential jurors stated 
that his brother ias a Grand County officer. (T. 27). He 
mas questioned briefly about his ability to judge the case. 
(T. 27-28). He also expressed prior knowledge of the 
informant and again was questioned superficially about the 
impact on his impartiality. (T. 42). His challenge for 
cause by the defendant was denied (T. 47) and defense did 
not use a peremptory challenge to strike him and he mas 
seated as a juror. One of the reasons the court relied on 
was the fact that his brother was not involved in the 
present case. (T. 47). Homever, during the trial, his 
brother (officer) was present in the courtroom and assisted 
the prosecution. (Rn objection to his presence mas made 
at an unrecorded sidebar and he left the courtroom.) (T. 
106). 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
Defendant MOB found guilty as charged by the jury. 
(R, 89). On October 21, 1992 defendant ias sentenced and 
committed to the Utah State Prison for a term of five years 
to life. (R. 102-5). 
D. Facts 
On November 16, 1991 Defendant was at the Haverick 
convenience store in floab, Grand County, Utah with two 
other individuals, co-defendants, Shannon Taylor and Kim 
Burke. For a few days prior and earlier the same day, Ms. 
Burke was in contact with the confidential informant, Danny 
Nickle, arranging to sell him nethamphetamine. (T. 73-76, 
60). tin. Nlckle was supervised by Ron Richmond vho worked 
for the Grand County Sheriff's Department and the Four 
Corners Narcotics Strike Force. (T. 74, 145). Approximately 
an hour before the transaction In question, Us. Taylor and 
Hs. Burke, met with the confidential informant vho was 
clerking at the store, picked up the money for the drugs, 
and scheduled the delivery. (T. 83-87). Rithough, the 
prior arrangements iere made by lis. Burke, Ms. Taylor 
appeared to be in charge at this point. (T. 66) Ms. Taylor 
stated that she had to cut the drugs herself (T. 123, 132) 
and that "(l)f you don't narc me, you've got a dealer." (T. 
121, 132). Though the confidential Informant's testimony 
varied during the preliminary hearing on this point, at 
trial he was adamant that he saw Mr. Edge put the 
methamphetamlne bindle on the counter. (T. 91, 101). He 
also testified that Ms. Burke then picked up the bindle and 
handed It to him, Hickle. (T. 125). The police officer mas 
unable to see the transaction. (T. 155). 
The incident was recorded and fir. Edge made a 
statement to Hickle that he didn't want to see him across a 
courtroom. (T. 93). Defendant explained he mas at the 
store to get cigarettes and not involved in any drug deal. 
(T. 172, 175). He also explained the courtroom comment vas 
due to concern about the Informant being a "narc" and fear 
of being set up as he was on parole at the time. (T. 174). 
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The testimony of both the officer and Informant varied 
on seueral substantial events throughout the day in 
question. One such point Is the "false start" there the 
informant was mired for a drug deal that did not happen. 
(T. 00). The officer did not remember this or include It 
In his report. (T. 162-63). The Informant noted In his 
report (Exhibit 4) that he mas given money at the earlier 
time, but denied it at trial. (T. 110, 129) The report 
was done on the same day as the transaction. (T. 102). 
Hickle also denied that the first mention of buying a 
gram of methamphetamine mas when Richmond told him to try 
to buy a gram. (T, 116, 129), He testified that mhen he 
talked with Ms. Burke, flue minutes before talking tilth 
Richmond, she mentioned a gram (T. 116) but that he didn't 
tell Richmond that he could get a gram because he didn't 
pay any attention to her saying a gram when ehe said It. 
(T, 117, 129). This later recollection is in direct 
conflict with his report. (117, 129, Exhibit 4). 
SUnnflRY DF flRCUHEHTS 
1. The trial court erred In not dismissing for cause 
the juror mho mas the brother of a local lam enforcement 
officer and mho had previous contact mlth the confidential 
Informant, 
2. The trial court erred In admitting evidence of 
defendant's prior criminal history, The trial court also 
5 
erred In admitting evidence of other subsequent bad acts of 
the defendant. 
3. The state did not present sufficient evidence to 
support the verdict of the Jury, 
RRGUMEHT 
1. Jury Selection 
The trial judge abused his discretion In falling to 
excuse Juror flcGann for cause after he indicated his 
relationship to a local Idi enforcement officer and his 
knowledge of the confidential Informant. The trial court's 
minimal investigation and questioning mas insufficient to 
rebut the Inference of bias. 
fl motion to dism 188 a prospective juror for cause Is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court. State v. 
Uoolleu. 810 P.2d 440,442 (Utah App.) c*M> denied, 826 P.2d 
651 (Utah 1991); State v. GotflchalL7B2 P.2d 459, 462 (Utah 
1989). However, "(l)t is prejudicial error to compel a 
party to exercise a peremptory challenge to remove a Jury 
panel member who should have been removed for cause." 
State v. Cox. 826 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah Rpp. 1992). 
Utah Appellate Courts have consistently emphasized 
that "It Is the (trial Judge's) duty to see that the 
constitutional right of an accused to an impartial jury Is 
safeguarded," and have reversed criminal convictions solely 
on the appearance that such right may have been 
6 
jeopardized, Uoollsu. 810 P.2d at 442 quoting State v. 
Dixon.560 P,2d 318, 319-20 (Utah 1977). 
That right Is guaranteed under Article I, Section 12 
of the Utah Constitution and the Sixth Riendnent to the 
United States Constitution Is codified in Utah Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 18(e) tihlch statss iihsn a Juror should 
be removed for cause. The pertinent grounds for Juror 
HcGann's renewal are\ 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship betieen 
the prospective Juror and any party, (fitness or 
person alleged to have been victimized or Injured 
by the defendant, which relationship when viewed 
objectively, would suggest to reasonable ninds 
that the prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be free 
of favoritism. . . . 
(14) that a state of wind exists on the part of 
the Juror with rsference to the cause, or to 
either party, which will prevent hit from acting 
(•partially and without prejudice to the 
substantial rights of the party challenging. . . . 
Utah R. Crln. P. 18(e)(4) and (14). 
The Issue of juror bias was raised during the court's 
voir dire Inquiry of Juror HcGann relative to his deputy 
sheriff brother: 
THE COURT: . . . Any of you had that experience 
In your background, where you've worked or 
members of your family have worked for a police 
department? Let's see, Mr. flagann? 
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hR, HRGflNN ( s i c ) } Hagann, Veah. fly brother 's a 
deputy s h e r i f f , 
THE COURTs find here In Grand County? 
HR I1RGRHN: Ves. 
THE COURT: Does he talk about his work tilth you 
all the tine? 
I1R, flRGRHN: Mot very o f ten . 
THE COURT: Not very often, huh? I wean, some 
guys are mouthy are It and sons aren't. So, do 
you think—lot's sss, he Is not listed as a 
witness here, but do you think the fact that he 
works for the sheriff's department, would that 
influence the way you would look at the evidence 
In this case? 
HR. I1RGRNN: Ho. I don't think so. 
THE COURT: Uould you glue more weight to a 
police officer than you would Just anybody else, 
because of your brother's association there? Or 
do you think if a police officer testified, you'd 
give it the fair weight you think It's entitled 
to receive? 
m, HRGRNN: That's hard t o — 
THE COURT: Hell, we Just have to have your best 
Judgwent on it, as to whether or not—In other 
words, the fact that a police officer, Is that 
fact going to make you give hln wore credibility 
or less credibility just because he's a police 
officer? That's, of courss, always the question 
we have to ask. 
HR. tlRGRHH: I think It-It would be the sawe. 
THE COURT: It would be the sane? Vou don't 
think that fact that your brother's In that 
profession wouldn't (lake any difference relative 
to the way you'd look at the evidence here? 
MR. I1RGRNH: No. I don't think so. 
THE COURT: I see. RlI right. Rnyone else now? 
(T. 27-28). (Note, the transcript spelling of NcGann's 
name Is incorrect). 
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Impartiality was also raised when NcGann stated that 
he knew the confidential Infornant and was questioned as 
follows: 
THE COURT; Anyone else on any of these fitnesses 
now that we've talked about? Let's see— 
riR, MRGRNH: Janes Magann, 
THE COURT; fir, Magann? 
MR, MRGRMH: I know Danny Hlckle froi the fire 
department, 
THE COURT; Is that the I lilt of your association 
with him? 
MR. ilRGRNN: Ves. 
THE COURT; Anything In what you know about nil 
that would make you want to glue wore or less 
weight to his testimony than you would anybody 
else, or Just what you think It's fairly entitled 
to receive? 
OR, MRGRNN: Frow what I've heard frou-frou 
Danny, that— 
THE COURT: Hell, don't tell us what that Is or 
anything else, nor whether It would be nore or 
MR. MRGRNH: No, I know, but I--I think I could 
be—listen objectively. 
THE COURT: Veah. Uhen you say heard fron hi*, 
you didn't talk about this case, did you, with 
hln? 
MR. MRGRNH: Ho. This was years ago. 
THE COURT: Oh. Vears ago. I see. 
So, there wasn't anything about this case that 
you talked— 
MR. MRGRHN: No. 
THE COURT: —talked to hln about? Okay. 
(T. 41-42). 
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Once such a bias is raised, the court must fully 
investigate the relationship. The "exploration should not 
be merely pro forma." Uoolleg. 810 P.2d at 445. The court 
cannot just rely on a "subsequent general statement by the 
juror that he or she can be fair and impartial" as was done 
in this case. Id, On both issues the trial court 
interrupted juror tlcGann fild-explanatIon; specifically, on 
the officer questioning, when he started to answer "That's 
hard t o — " (T. 28) and on the Hlckle questioning then he 
said "from what he'd heard from Danny—M (T. 42). Neither 
one of these equivocal statements mere pursued by the 
judge, who relied on further less than emphatic answers. 
(For further review of voir dire bias investigation, please 
see Uoolleu 810 P.2d 445-48). 
The lack of sufficient questioning Is of extra concern 
in the present case which Involves double potential bias. 
In a similar case, the Utah Court of Appeals found that the 
court's failure to remove a Juror (RustIn) whose brother-
in-law uas police chief and who had a recent attorney-
client relationship with the prosecutor was reversible 
error. The Court held that "(t)he cumulative effect of 
Austin having two possibly prejudicial rslationships is 
especially troubling given 'that It Is a simple matter to 
obviate any problem of bias simply by excusing the 
prospective Juror and selecting another.1" Cox. 826 P.2d at 
661, quoting Uoolley. 810 P.2d at 442. The wisdom of this 
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simple solution was echoed by the Tenth Circuit who held 
thus Iy because they: 
have no psychic calipers with which to measure 
the purity of the prospective Juror; rather, our 
mundane experience nust guide us to the Impartial 
jury promised by the Sixth Amendment, Doubts 
about the existence of actual bias should be 
resolved against permitting the Juror to serve, 
unless the prospective panelist's protsstatlon of 
a purge of preconception Is positive, not pallid. 
Burton v. Johnson.948 F.2d 1150, 1158 (10th Clr. 1991). 
That course (dismissal of flcGann for cause) should 
have been followed In the present case and the trial Judge 
abused his discretion by not doing so, 
2. Admission of Criminal History 
A. The trial court committed reversible error In 
admitting evidence of defendant's prior felony convictions, 
without requiring prosecution to neet Its burden of proof 
and without the necessary weighing process, 
Rdmlsslon of said evidence is governed by Rule 609, 
Utah Rules of Evidence. The overriding Issue Is whether 
the probative value of the convictions outweighs their 
prejudicial effect. The admission of such evidence should 
be carefully balanced due to: 
tendency of a fact finder to convict the accused 
because of bad character rather than because he 
is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged. 
Because of this tendency, such evidence Is 
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presumed prejudicial and, absent a reason for the 
adn1881 on of the evidence other than to show 
criminal disposition, the evidence Is excluded. 
StflU y, Saunders, 699 P.2d 738 at 711 (Utah 1985). The 
trial court noted that potential prejudicial impact In Its 
decision: 
, . . ordinarily, . . . the evidence of other 
crimes Is not admissible because of Its 
prejudicial effect, where a Jury might be 
inclined to—-to convict Just on the fact that 
he's — o r make—might make the determination 
that he's a bad—bad person or has bad 
character. 
(T. 177). Despite the inherent problems with admitting 
such evidence, which the court acknowledged, he allowed the 
use of the prior convictions because; 
And as to credibility on the felony convictions, 
again, In cases of where the credibility is a 
key Issue, and that's what we have In this 
case, although we do have some other somewhat 
corroborating evidence by way of Mr. Richmond 
and the Informant, credibility Is a key Issue 
here; so, because of that, the Court's going to 
allow the questions and the—see what his answer 
Is to those, for those reasons. 
(T. 176). The prosecution offered no rationale for the use 
of the convictions, he merely stated his Intent to use 
them. (T. 176-77). He stated no rule allowing for the 
admission of the convictions and offered no evidence that 
introduction of the convictions was more probative than 
prejudicial. "It Is universally held that the prosecution 
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under Rule 609(a)(1) has the burden of persuading the court 
that the probative ualue of admitting the convictions, as 
far as shedding light on the Defendant's credibility, 
outweighs the prejudicial effect to the Defendant." State 
v. Banner. 717 P.2d 1325 at 1332 (Utah 1986). Even though 
the prosecution did nothing to meet that burden the Court, 
sua sponte, determined that the convictions should be used 
to help the jury determine defendant's credibility. The 
Court did not Indicate on which rule of evidence he based 
his decision and did not make any findings, specifically he 
did not find that their probative value outuelghed the 
prejudicial Impact on the jury. 
Rs the Judge noted, the case mas not very strong, he 
characterized the prosecution case as having "someiihat 
corroborating evidence" and stated that credibility lias the 
key issue. In a circumstantial case, the court should 
consider the importance of the accused's testimony, as 
perhaps warranting the exclusion of convictions probative 
of the accused's character for veracity. Banner. 717 P.2d 
at 1332 quoting 32B flm. Jur. 2d fetfara/ fftt/es of Evidence 
§ 120 (1982), in such a case, the evidence of prior 
convictions Is more likely to be prejudicial and harmful. 
The underlying motive for the state to admit such 
convictions mould be to shoi that the defendant Is a bad 
person and should not be believed, That Is exactly horn 
they mere used at trial. The prosecutor argued in effect 
that defendant should not be believed because "He's a 
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convicted felony." (etc.) (T, 213) They were also used to 
show criminal disposition as prohibited In Saunders. In 
effect arguing to the Jury that defendant Is a criminal so 
he must have c o m itted the crlne at issue. 
In the present case, the I•permissible analysis mas 
urged, as stated above, by the prosecutor's argument that 
defendant is a convicted felon , "He's someone mho is in 
trouble, he's trying to get out. Ulll someone under those 
circumstances not tell you the truth In order to try and 
get out of trouble". (T. 214). This comment clearly urged 
the Jury to view Edge as a person mho commits crimes and to 
U9e this characteristic as evidence that he distributed 
methamphetamine. This is especially prejudicial in a less 
than strong case. "In close cases, the substantive use of 
a prior conviction can often tilt the balance In favor of 
convictions, particularly In instant case, where . , . 
character Is at the heart of his defense." State v. Emmett 
839 P.2d 781, 184 Utah fldv. Rep. 34 at 36 (Utah 1992). 
The weighing of prejudicial and probative value is 
also found under Rule 403, which provides that "Although 
relevant, evidence may be excluded If Its probative value 
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the Issued, or misleading the Jury, 
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." Utah R. 
Evld. 403. The rationale of Rule 403 further points out 
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the error in admitting the prior convict Ions, which even 
assuming relevancy are Impermissibly prejudicial. Factors 
to be considered in making that determination Include 
the strength of the evidence as to the commission 
of the other crime, the similarities between 
the crimes, the Interval of time that has elapsed 
between the crimes, the need for the evidence, 
the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree 
to which the evidence probably •III rouse the Jury 
to overmastering hostility. 
State v. Schicklea. 760 P.2d 291 at 296 (Utah 1988). Under 
the above analysis, the convictions should not have been 
a 11 owed{ while there Is no question about the convictions, 
there are no similarities between them and the present 
charge, the stolen property conviction was three years old 
and the arson and burglary were six years old, the 
accused's testimony and the Importance of credibility in 
this case were critical because of evidentiary problems in 
the case, and the charges of arson, burglary and possession 
of stolen property were euch that they caused the Jury to 
be unable to impartially look at the evidence. Said 
admission was an abuse of discretion and clearly harmful to 
the defendant. Under Rule 609 and 403, the convictions 
should not have been admitted. 
D. The trial court erred in admitting evidence 
of defendant's prior drug paraphernalia conviction. 
The pertinent rule is Rule 404(b) as the conviction Is 
a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or false statement 
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and therefore Rule 609 in not applicable. Rule 404(b) Utah 
Rules of Evidence states: 
Evidence of other crimes, irongs or acts Is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person In order to show that he acted In 
conformity therewith, It lay, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof 
of motive, opportunity, Intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, Identity, or absence of 
mistake or accident. 
The Judge seems to have used the Rule 404(b) analysis in 
allowing In the misdemeanor conviction. (T. 177-78). The 
court's rationale for admitting that conviction Is as 
folIons; 
Then of course, the exception to that Is in 
cases of where It's the sane type of an offense, 
like the drug paraphernal I a,they're usually 
admissible to show that there Is—that Is — 
that there wasn't a •Istaks,Intent,where the 
testimony that he and the other primary witness 
ore absolutely contrary to each other, to show 
the absence of mistake or accident, the fact of 
Intent, that Is, he would have knowledge of drugs 
If it was around, the fact that he's had some 
prior association with them. 
(T. 177-78). Rs stated supra, that analysis Is an abuse of 
discretion because there was no requisite offer by the 
prosecution as to any basis for seeking the adilsslon of 
the paraphernalia conviction. The state clearly did not 
indicate that admission was sought to show absence of 
16 
mistake or Intent, Also as noted supra, the prosecution 
U9ed this conviction to shon bad character. 
Even if the conviction fas adiissible under Rule 
404(b) it «ould still have to be admissible under Rule 403 
(supra). The prejudicial Inpact of related convictions Is 
very high, It Is often difficult for Jurors to separate or 
distinguish between two different Instances involving 
controlled substances. It Is very likely that the Jury 
decided that since the defendant had been convicted of 
possession of drug paraphernal la, he euet be guilty of 
distribution of drugs. 
This conviction falls within the Uniting language of 
403. The conviction unfairly prejudiced the defendant 
because it invoked the instinct of the jury to punish 
and/or caused thee to base their decision on something 
other than the facts of the caee. Terry v. Zlons COOP. 
Mercantile Inst.. 605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979). Based on the 
nature of the present charge, It is very probable that the 
admission of this conviction, caused the jury to render 
their decision based on the conviction rather than the 
evidence presented. 
The standard of revlee for the admission of all the 
prior convictions Is abuse of discretion. R reversal of 
conviction for Improper Iy admitted evidence Is required 
when there is a "reasonable likelihood that the error 
affected the outcone of the proceedings." State v. 
Hani I ton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 (Utah 1992). Rs stated, supra, 
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based on the nature of the charge and the convictions and 
the evidence presented, there It Is none likely than not 
that admitting the convictions affected the jury's 
decision. 
C. The Court committed plain error In allowing 
testimony on bad acts. 
The court allowed the officer to testify in rebuttal 
on the extrinsic issue of later drug use, after a denial by 
defendant, Based on rules 404(b) and 403, see discussion 
supra, it mas plain error and clearly harmful to alloi such 
prejudicial testimony, especially to shorn that defendant 
was a bad person. 
The standard of rev lei for the bad act testimony is 
plain error because no objection mas made at trial. State 
v. Emmett. 839 P.2d 781, 184 Utah fldv. Rep. 34 at 35 (Utah 
1992). "Plain error is error that Is both harmful and 
obvious." id, Rlloiing the officer to testify about 
subsequent drug use allotted the jury to make the 
impermissible assumption that defendant mas a bad person 
and therefore must have committed the crime charged. The 
probative value mas clearly outmelghed by the danger of 
unfair prejudice. 
3. Insufficient evidence. 
There mas insufficient evidence to support the jury's 
verdict. 
18 
fi review of the facts, supra, ehoi substantial 
questions as to the credibility of the chief witness, which 
was noted by the trial Judge, supra. The significant 
differences between the officer and the informant, the 
memory problems of the Informant and Inconsistencies In his 
testimony shot that the evidence is Insufficient and 
inconclusive. Rlso, the prosecution scenario Is Inherently 
improbable, given the defendant's lack of Involvemsnt in 
any of the precedent transactions, (Is. Taylor's comments on 
being a dealer and cutting the drugs, and the defendant's 
desire to not be involved In drugs due to his parole status 
all support defendant's claim that reasonable minds must 
had reasonable doubts. 
The standard for review of such a claim Is as follows: 
In dealing with a claim of insufficiency of 
the evidence, "(T)he evidence and the reasonable 
Inferences which might be drawn therefrom must be 
viewed In the light most favorable to the jury 
verdict. R Jury conviction Is reversed for 
insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so 
viewed, Is sufficiently Inconclusive or 
Inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime of which he was 
convicted." 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1111, 1117 (Utah 1989) accord 
State v. Jonas. 793 P.2d 902, 905 (Utah Rpp. 1990). Under 
this standard the conviction ehould be reversed for 
Inconclusive evidence. 
19 
The above discussed errors of the trial court and the 
insufficient evidence deprived the defendant of his right 
to due process and a fair trial. Especially then looked at 
as a whole, It is clear that defendant's conviction should 
be reversed. He tas denied his right to an Impartlal jury 
and evidence uas improperly adnltted, he fas thue denied 
his right to fair trial. The conviction should be reversed 
and the case should be renanded for a ne« trial, 
Respectfully submitted this 2^£_ day of April, 1993. 
Sandra U, Star ley 
Attorney for Defendant 
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copies of the the foregoing brief of appellant to: 
Utah Attorney General 
Rppellate Division 
236 State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841H 
^%H4AA 
-S-. 
Attorney for Defendant 
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AlfflEHMIM 
Rule 609. Impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime. 
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a 
witness, evidence that he has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if 
elicited from him or established by public record during cross-examination 
but only if the crime (1) was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess 
of one year under the law under which he was convicted, and the court 
determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect to the defendant.... 
Rule 26(2)(a), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
(2) An appeal may be taken by the defendant from: 
(a) the final judgment of conviction, whether by verdict or plea. 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 
Rule 3. Appeal as of right: how taken. 
(a) Filing appeal form final orders and judgments. An appeal may 
be taken from a district, juvenile, or circuit court to the appellate court with 
jurisdiction over the appeal from all final orders and judgments, except as 
otherwise provided by law, by filing a notice of appeal with the clerk of the 
trial court within the time allowed by Rule 4. Failure of an appellant to take 
any step other than the timely filing of a notice of appeal does not affect the 
validity of the appeal, but is ground only for such action as the appellate 
court deems appropriate, which may include dismissal of the appeal or other 
sanctions short of dismissal, as well as the award of attorney fees. 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-1-6. Rights of defendant. 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(g) To the right of appeal in all cases. 
a 
Utah Code Annotated. Section 78-2a-3(2)(k) 
Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of 
interlocutory appeals, over: 
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme 
Court. 
Utah Constitution. Article 1. Section 12 
(Rights of accused persons.) 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right . . . to have 
a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which 
the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all 
cases. 
United States Constitution. Amendment VI 
(Rights of accused.) 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed 
b 
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